Relative Responsibility in AFDC: Problems Raised by the NOLEO approach—“If at First You Don\u27t Succeed . . .” by Howard, Margaret
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 9
January 1975
Relative Responsibility in AFDC: Problems Raised
by the NOLEO approach—“If at First You Don't
Succeed . . .”
Margaret Howard
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret Howard, Relative Responsibility in AFDC: Problems Raised by the NOLEO approach—“If at First You Don't Succeed . . .”, 9 Urb.
L. Ann. 203 (1975)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/9
RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN AFDC:
PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE NOLEO APPROACH-
"IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED ... ."
MARGARET HOWARD*
"Relative responsibility laws" is a generic term for legislation re-
quiring an indigent's relatives to contribute, solely or in concert with
welfare authorities, to that indigent's support. Relative responsibility
provisions are found in a variety of welfare statutes, including pro-
grams for the aged poor, requiring support payments from the in-
digent's adult children, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) ,' which requires support from fathers who have deserted
or abandoned their children.
This Note will begin by reviewing the popularly asserted justifica-
tions for relative responsibility provisions and the social costs involved
in their enforcement. Attention will then shift to AFDC's relative
responsibility provisions, Notice to Law Enforcement Officials
(NOLEO), and then move to a preliminary critique of the recently
enacted Child Support Program. The Note will outline the new
provisions and briefly pinpoint several administrative problems the
new statute presents, followed by inquiry into constitutional issues
it raises.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY LAws
Three major justifications provide the basis for relative responsibility
provisions in welfare legislation.2 The first is essentially a moral be-
*A.B., Duke University, 1969; J.D., M.S.W., Washington University, 1975.
1. Social Security Act §§ 401-10, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970).
2. Two additional justifications are less frequently mentioned. First, popular
belief that most poor are members of minority groups, whether accurate or not,
suggests that racial prejudice may play a subtle role in punitive welfare legislation.
Cf. Paul, The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals: Current Attacks on
Illegitimacy and the AFDC Program, 3 LAw & Soc'y. REv. 77 (1968). Secondly,
the giving of gratuitous support, coupled with low benefits and burdensome ad-
ministrative rules and practices, may indicate conflicting feelings about the poor
and dependent:
[S]ociety simultaneously loves and hates its poor, its dependent, and its dis-
abled. The emotion of love requires that the poor and weak be protected,
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lief that welfare legislation must encourage responsibility and the
fulfillment of common law duties3 Proponents of this view argue that
if support were not required, persons who disregard needy relatives
would be favored over those assisting their relatives at considerable
personal inconvenience.-
Family preservation provides the second justification for relative
responsibility provisions. Its proponents argue that the enactment of
such provisions will strengthen and preserve family ties.5 The en-
nurtured, and provided for, as if they were helpless children. Failure to do
so would cause collective guilt ....
The concurrent hatred implies fear-deep, primitive, unconscious fear-
that the very existence of the poor and weak in society threatens the existence
of that society. Punitive sanctions must then be applied to control those
whom one fears, to make certain that they do not grow and prosper ....
The solution- a typically neurotic one, in my opinion - is to compromise
by both giving to and oppressing the nonpersons [the have-nots].
Diamond, The Children of Leviathan: Psychoanalytic Speculations Concerning
Welfare Law and Punitive Sanctions, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 361-62, 365 (1965).
See also Paul, supra, at 105 & n.47.
3. Relative responsibility laws are not, in fact, a product of English common
law, under which the only support obligation was the duty of a husband to sup-
port his wife. Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws,
54 MICH. L. Rav. 497, 489-99 (1956). Rather, they are a product of the PooR
LAW, a statute. See generally, tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law:
Its Origin, Development, and Present Status (pt. 1), 16 STAN. L. Rav. 257, 258-
91 (1964).
4. F. BOND, OuR NEEDY AGED 353 (1954).
5. Senator Nunn expressed this viewpoint, Hearings on S. 1842 & S. 2081
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 1842]: "I am interested in this legislation and I think it
is a key to trying to do something about the existing welfare rolls and, also, about
the breakdown of families in this Nation. I feel that it is just as important as
saving money to try to do something about the breakup of families that is causing
not only welfare problems, but problems throughout our entire social and criminal
law stratum."
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, recently made a similar assertion: "We believe more emphasis needs to be
placed on the child support enforcement programs to assure that financially able
parents contribute to the support of their children. Better enforcement of parent
responsibility for support may deter fathers from deserting their families." Hearings
on the Economic Problems of Women before the Joint Economic C,,mm., 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 412 (1973) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
Economic Hearings].
Finally, the Senate Report on the Social Services Amendments of 1974 re-
marked that "as an effective support collection system is established fathers will
be deterred from deserting their families to welfare and children will be spared
the effects of family breakup." S. REP. No. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess .........
(1974), reported in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, No. 15, at 9193, 9206
(1975) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 93-1356].
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forcement process itself is considered an aid to reuniting estranged
families.a The contrary view, however, is that the enforcement proc-
ess merely increases already existing bitterness and estrangement be-
tween family members.7 Prosecuting fathers for failure to support
their children 8 diminishes chances for reconciliation with the mother,"
6. F. BOND, supra note 4, at 352-53.
7. The welfare system itself is popularly blamed for causing fathers to desert
their families. Congresswoman Griffiths, for example, remarked:
According to Federal law, the AFDC program is intended to help maintain
and strengthen family life and to help parents become self-supporting. In
reality, the program encourages fathers to desert their families, leaving mothers
to support and raise the children alone ...
In 27 States [those without the AFDC-UP program], families with two
able-bodied parents are not eligible for AFDC. In order for such a family
to qualify, one parent must leave home, and it is usually the father who leaves.
In the other 23 States [those with AFDC-UP]. families with two able-bodied
parents may receive AFDC, but only if the father is unemployed and does not
rece;ve unemployment insurance. Families with an unemployed father become
ineligible when the father works 100 or more hours per month, no matter how
little he earns. . . Thus, the AFDC program provides a financial incentive
fr low-income families to split up, leaving the mother to bear the responsi-
bilities of parenthood alone.
Economic Hearings, supra note 5, at 339-40. The Unemployed Parent program
(AFDC-UP), optional with the states, provides assistance to children whose
fathers are in the home but unemployed, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970), while the
basic AFDC program requires that one parent be absent from the home.
Clearly, the welfare system cannot both break families apart and bring them
back together. If, in reality, fathers are leaving home in order to qualify their
families for welfare, it is because those fathers are unable to support their families.
Mandatory support provisions, strictly enforced, will be of little help to families
in this situation. Fathers, knowing they wilI be pursued by legal authorities, will
still have to leave in order to qualify their families for assistance, and a support
order ill have no effect on a man who left because he had nothing to contribute
financially. To return to his family would disqualify them for assistance.
8. The stresses differ when support is sought from an adult child for his indigent
parent. Adult children called upon to support their parents may "resent the
financial and personal ties that the statute compels" and interpret the dependence
as symbolic of "the personal inadequacy of the needy individual." Tully, Family
Responsibility Laws: An Unwise and Unconstitutional Impsitisn. 5 FAMILY L.Q.
32, 39 (1971). Psychological stresses may operate within the dependent relative,
leading to feelings of inadequacy and failure. In addition, support responsibility
may require that the indigent parent be taken into the child's home, resulting in
forced sharing of accommodations .%hen one or both parties might prefer other
arrangements. Id. at 43. Such difficulties lead to the suggestion that, in a society
moving away from extended family relationships, "the family is no longer equipped
to be the primary institution to support needy relatives." Id. at 44. Some evi-
dence suggests that children called upon to support their indigent parents can
do so only at the expense of their own children. Rosenbaum, Are Family Respon-
sibility Laws Constitutional?, 1 FAMiLY L.Q., No. 4, at 55, 67 (1967).
9. Mandelker, supra note 3, at 611; Redlich, Unconstitutional Conditions on
Welfare Eligibility, 1970 Wis. L. Rav. 450, 454; Silver & Efroymson, Suggested
19761
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and thus reduces the likelihood of establishing (or re-establishing) a
stable two-parent family.10
Saving public .welfare money is the third, and most frequently as-
serted, justification for relative responsibility statutes.1 ' Insufficient
evidence exists, however, to determine whether support requirements
do, in fact, save money. Secretary of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) Caspar Weinberger's recent testimony
before the Senate Finance Committee suggests that California and
Washington, which have enacted legislation to increase the incentives
for tracking down absent parents, have experienced a recovery of
funds three to four times greater than collection costs.1 2 The Senate
Report on the Social Services Amendments of 1974 asserts that "[t]hose
States which did assess administrative costs in terms of support
collected indicated that in general about twenty cents in collection
costs resulted in a dollar return of support payments." 3 The Report,
however, admits that accurate information is sketchy and that few
Attacks on the NOLEO Requirement, 4 CLEARINOHOUSE REV. 1, 13 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Silver & Efroymson].
10. Comment, AFDC Eligibility and the Mandatory Paternity Suit, 10 J. FAbILY
L. 174 (1970).
The viewpoint of the recipient was expressed by Johnnie Tillmon, Executive
Director of the National Welfare Rights Organization:
The mother at that point [after the father has left in order to qualify the
children for AFDC] proceeds to seek assistance. AFDC now takes the tone
of a super-sexist marriage. You trade in a man for the man. You can't
divorce him if he treats you bad. But he divorces you by cutting off assistance.
She is then confronted with title 45, chapter II, section 220.48, which ad-
dresses itself to paternity. She is asked who is the father of her children
and if she will assist in seeking support payments. If her answer is no, in
some States, she will be ineligible for aid.
Her family is again faced with a decision which will eventually further
divide the family and renounce all hopes of being reunited. This may appear
to be a rare case in the eyes of the committee, but may I take this oppor-
tunity to inform you that it is not.
Economic Hearings, supra note 5, at 391. Ms. Tillmon's reference is to 45 C.F.R.
§ 220.48 (1974).
11. Mandelker, supra note 3, at 501, citing People v. Hill, 163 11. 186, 46
N.E. 796 (1896), and Ketcham v. Ketcham, 176 Misc. 993, 29 N.Y.S.2d 773
(Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
12. Hearings on S. 1842, supra note 5, at 80.
13. S. REP. No. 93-1356, supra note 5, at 9209. The Report, however, neither
lists "those States" nor indicates what administrative cost factors were included.
The table in the Report provides only amounts collected; it does not list amounts
expended, thus preventing the reader from making an independent judgment.
Id.; see note 14 infra.
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states have made a concerted effort to enforce support obligations.14
Most writers take the position that, once administrative costs are
deducted, the statutes do not result in a net savings of welfare funds. 5
Without more detailed information, the real impact of the statutes
on gross welfare savings cannot be evaluated.' 6
In any event, the argument that stringent support provisions
do in fact save welfare money is undercut by data suggesting that
court ordered support payments are set too low and collected too
14. The Senate Report quotes a four-state study of child support programs
conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and reported in. March,
1972. The GAO found that HEW
has not monitored the States' child support enforcement activities and had
not required the States to report on the status or progress of the activities.
Consequently, HEW regional offices did not have information on the number
of absent parents or amount of child support collections involved or the
progress and problems being experienced by the States in collecting child
support. . . . Regional officials informed us that they did not, at the time
of our field work, have any plans to evaluate the support enforcement
programs or impose reporting requirements on the States.
S. REP. No. 93-1356, supra note 5, at 9208. Furthermore, HEW admitted in
Senate Finance Committee hearings held eighteen months after the GAO report
that it still did not have information on "the extent to which the paternity of
illegitimate AFDC children has been established, the extent to which court orders
for the support of AFDC children have been obtained, the amount of support
collections for AFDC children, or the amount of Federal matching funds devoted
to the States' administrative expenses in connection with child support." Id. at
9209.
It is submitted by this writer that necessary information is unavailable to assess
accurately the effectiveness of stringent enforcement of support obligations in
reducing welfare budgets. This is a cause of great concern in light of repeated
Congressional efforts to increase enforcement efforts. See Social Services Amend-
ments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-60 (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975).
15. Comment, Pennsylvania's Family Responsibility Statute-Corruption of
Blood and Denial of Equal Protection, 77 DicK. L. REv. 331, 350 (1973) and
sources cited therein. The commentator's conclusion is reasonable in light of fathers'
desertion of their families to make them eligible for AFDC support. See note 7
supra.
16. Accurate information is a prerequisite to a viable assessment of the economic
impact of relative responsibility statutes. The Community Service Society of New
York challenged findings of the Moreland Commission that New York collected
7.25 million dollars from responsible relatives at a cost of 1.25 million dollars:
"The recovery of $7.25 million includes all lump-sum recoveries from recipients,
estates of deceased recipients and relatives achieved through court and other
legal procedures, but excludes relatives' monthly contributions which are buried
in case records. The cost figures ignore expenditures to establish the existence
of responsible relatives and their ability to contribute." Rosenbaum, supra note
8, at 60, quoting COMMUNITY SERVICE Soc'y oF NEw YORK, FAmILIAL RESPON-
sIBILITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE 8 (1964).
1975]
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infrequently to be of any help to recipient families."' Taken to-
gether, low payment levels and recurrent non-compliance mean that
welfare departments will often have to make up for unpaid support
obligations. It is submitted that no net savings of welfare funds will
result after these replacement payments (plus administrative costs
of securing support orders and recalculating welfare budgets) are
subtracted from gross savings.' s In addition, families needing welfare
assistance may be hurt more by unpaid court-ordered support pay-
ments than if no support entitlement had initially been established.0
Thus despite substantial legislative and administrative efforts,2 0 it is
17. While little data exists regarding compliance with support orders based on
a welfare population, evidence is available regarding compliance with support
orders issued in conjunction with divorce. Support orders are fully complied with
during the first year following divorce in only 38% of the cases; no compliance
at all was found in 42% of the cases. Nagel & Weitzman, Women as Litigants,
23 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 189-91 (1971). The full compliance figure steadily drops
to 13% ten years after the order, and there is no compliance at that point in
79% of the cases. Despite this poor showing, legal action (in the form of contempt
proceedings, rather than prosecutions for non-support) was taken in only 19%
of the cases the first year and one percent the tenth year. Id. at 190.
The authors, noting that payment levels are based on ability to pay, indicate
that poor enforcement may be attributable to pro-male bias on the part of legis-
lators, judges and prosecutors. Id. at 191. Although one might expect support
orders in welfare cases to be more stringently enforced than in divorce cases due
to the interest of welfare departments, the analogy to the welfare context is still
clear. Additionally, the marginal economic position of many deserting fathers
suggests that ability-to-pay arguments overlook the difficulties these men face in
meeting their court-ordered obligations. These individuals are particularly suscep-
tible to economic fluctuations and the reduced need for unskilled labor. They
may also be less likely to resort to the courts for an adjustment in their support
obligations. Welfare recipients agree with the commentators that support orders
are inadequately enforced. Economic Hearings, supra note 5, at 404 (temarks of
Johnnie Tillmon).
18. In addition to actual costs, social costs are incurred by families who must
wait for their replacement checks.
19. In determining the need of the welfare recipient the state may not presume
that support obligations have been met; only income and resources actually avail-
able can be counted in determining the grant level. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S.
552 (1970). The welfare department, therefore, must compute the monthly grant
on, the basis of the support actually paid. Even if grants are recomputed every
month, sporadic or partial payments cause fluctuation in the recipient's income.
Note, Maintaining Welfare Families' Income in Kentucky: A Study of the Rela.
tionship Between AFDC Grants and Support Payments from Absent Parents, 57
Ky. L.J. 228, 245-46 n.80 (1969). When recomputations are made, delay and
inconveniences to the recipient will be burdens added to the uncertainties of
a fluctuating income.
20. The Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-60 (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975), are the most recent attempt to increase compliance with out-
standing support orders.
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doubtful that even stringent collection procedures will ultimately
benefit either the needy family or the welfare department. Nevertheless,
proponents of relative responsibility laws continue to assert the
importance of such procedures.21 This is cause of great concern in
light of recent Congressional action to increase efforts to enforce
collection of support obligations.
II. RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN AFDC: NOLEO
The legislative history of the Social Services Amendments of 197422
(1974 Amendments) stresses the soaring costs of AFDC and asserts
that increased enforcement of support obligations will help curtail
these costs. To effectuate this goal, the 1974 Amendments significantly
altered eligibility requirements under the AFDC provisions by re-
quiring that recipient families cooperate with state enforcement pro-
cedures. It addition, the 1974 Amendments have erected a new set
of administrative mechanisms designed to bolster collection of support
obligations.
A. The Old and the New Statutory Schemes
The relative responsibility provision in AFDC, known as NOLEO,
was added to the Social Security Act in 1950. 23 NOLEO required that
each state AFDC plan "provide for prompt notice to appropriate law-
enforcement officials of the furnishing of aid to families with dependent
children in respect of a child who has been deserted or abandoned by
a parent." 24 Congress became dissatisfied with certain procedural
21. Hearings on S. 1842, supra note 5, at 58-59 (remarks of Senator Nunn):
Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that if this bill is enacted the additional
costs of obtaining child support will be more than offset by welfare savings.
Some of these savings will be measurable as a result of the increased support
payments offsetting AFDC grants. But more important will be the invisible
but very real savings which result if fewer families going [sic] on welfare
in the first place. And this bill can make that happen by making it clear
that the day has passed in this nation when men or women can abandon
their families to welfare without facing any substantial fear of being held
responsible for the support of their children.
22. S. RaP. No. 93-1356, supra note 5, at 9205-08.
23. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950 ch. 809, § 321(b), 64 Stat. 549,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(11) (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (11) (1970). The section has recently been amended
to read: "provide for prompt notice (including the transmittal of all relevant
information) to the State child support collection agency (established pursuant
to part D of this title) of the furnishing of aid to families with dependent
children with respect to a child who has been deserted or abandoned by a parent
(including a child born out of wedlock without regard to whether the paternity
19751
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aspects of NOLEO in 1967 when AFDC was generally under heavy
criticism. The then-existing statute did not provide for a formal
relationship between the welfare departments and local law enforce-
ment agencies. The informal relationships that developed were in-
sufficient to reach every deserting parent. In response to these pro-
cedural shortcomings, Congress provided for the reimbursement of
law enforcement agencies by welfare departments, with partial federal
funding.25 In addition, each local welfare department was required
to have a separate unit, with a full-time staff, responsible for locating
and recovering support from absent parents.2 06 When even these efforts
proved insufficient, Congress responded with the 1974 Amendments,
substantially altering the statutory scheme.
The 1974 Amendments overruled decisions27 holding that a state
of such child has been established) . . . ." Social Services Amendments of 1974,
42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(11) (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975).
25. Social Security Act § 402 (a)(18), 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(18) (1970).
26. The former section 602(a), now repealed, read:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must ...
(i7) provide-
(A) for the development and implementation of a program under which the
State agency will undertake -
(i) in the case of a child born out of wedlock who is receiving aid to
families with dependent children, to establish the paternity of such child
and secure support for him, and
(B) for the establishment of a single organizational unit in the State agency
or local agency administering the State plan in each political subdivision
which will be responsible for the administration of the program referred to
in clause (A) ....
Id. § 402(a)(17), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1970).
27. Doe v. Flowers, 364 F. Supp. 953 (N.D.W. Va. 1973), aff'd mem., 94
S. Ct. 1921 (1974); Story v. Roberts, 352 F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Doe
v. Ellis, 350 F. Supp. 375 (D.S.C. 1972); Doe v. Gillman, 347 F. Supp. 483
(N.D. Iowa 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp.
357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.M. 1972);
Saddler v. Winstead, 332 F. Supp. 130 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Doe v. Swank, 332
F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987
(1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759
(D. Ore.), affd mem., 404 U.S. 803 (1971); Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302
(D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 (1970); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.
Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970). Contra,
Lascaris v. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 67 Misc. 2d 17, 323 N.Y.S.2d
567 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
Each of these decisions turned on a finding of conflict between state eligibility
and § 602(a)(10) of the federal statute, as it stood prior to 1974. That section
required that "aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with
[Vol. 9:203
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could not make a welfare recipient's eligibility depend upon com-
pliance with NOLEO.2 S It is now dear that Congress intends to
make compliance a condition of eligibility,29 not for the child but
for the "applicant,""" who in most instances is the dependent child's
mother seeking benefits as a caretaker relative.31 The 1974 Amend-
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals .... " Social Security Act §
402(a)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970).
The courts relied heavily on NOLEO's legislative history in holding that
compliance as a requirement of eligibility conflicted with the pre-existing §
602(a) (10). Remarks of Representative Wilbur Mills were widely quoted: "Are
you satisfied with the fact that illegitimacy in this country is rising and rising
and rising? I am not. We have tried to encourage the States to develop programs
to do something about it. We are not going to take a child off the rolls in any
State nor fail to participate with Federal funds in the care of the child, regardless
of what the parent does." 113 CoNo. REc. 23053 (1967) (emphasis added),
quoted in Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761, 767 (D. Conn. 1969). In addition,
the courts looked to HEW regulations stating expressly that NOLEO, as it stood
in 1967, did not impose an additional eligibility requirement. HEW, HANDBOOK
or PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, § 8120, quoted in Doe v.
Shapiro, supra, at 766.
28. E.g., I CONN. HAND3OOK OF SOCIAL SERVICES ch. III, § P.3460.1(2) (b),
invalidated in Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969).
The state statutes and regulations varied in their applicability. Some required
disclosure of the putative father's name, Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D.
Conn. 1969); others required the filing of a paternity action, Taylor v. Martin,
330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S.
980 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), aff'd mem., 404 U.S.
803 (1971). The Wisconsin statute attacked in Doe v. Schmidt, 330 F. Supp.
159 (E.D. Wis. 1971), applied to married women. It required commencement
of divorce, separation or other legal action against the husband as a condition of
eligibility.
29. Lascaris v. Shirley, 43 U.S.L.W. 4422 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975); S. REP.
No. 93-1356, supra note 5, at 9212-13.
30. A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must
... (26) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant
or recipient will be required-
(A) to assign the State any rights to support from any other person such
applicant may have . . .
(B) to cooperate with the State
(i) in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock with respect
to -whom aid is claimed, and
(ii) in obtaining support payments for such applicant and for a child with
respect to whom such aid is claimed..... if the relative with whom a child
is living is found to be ineligible because of failure to comply with the
requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, any aid for
which such child is eligible will be provided" in the form of protective pay-
ments as described in section 406(b)(2) [42 U.S.C. § 606(b)(2)] ....
Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(26) (Pamphlet No.
1, 1975).
31. Social Security Act § 406(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 606(b)(2) (1970).
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ments also require the assignment of support rights to tie state.A2
The support obligation becomes a debt payable to the state, which
distributes the proceeds to the family, retaining a specified portion to
offset welfare benefits paid to the family.33
In order to locate absent parents, the 1974 Amendments established
a Parent Locator Service, to be run by a separate organizational unit
within HEW.34 The Service is empowered to obtain "the most recent
address and place of employment of any absent parent" that is con-
tained either in HEW files or in the records of "any other department,
agency, or instrumentality, or [sic] the United States or of any State."35
This provision is, apparently, aimed at tapping the extensive informa-
tion available in Internal Revenue Service (IRS) files.
After the absent parent's whereabouts are established, the state
agency administering the "plan for child support"'3 must establish
his paternity, if necessary, and seek an order for support.37 The
amount of the support obligation can be set either by a court order 38
or, in the absence thereof, "in accordance with a formula approved
by the Secretary." 39 It appears, therefore, that an administrative
procedure will be made available for determining the level of support
payments.
Collection of support obligations can be carried out in the tradi.
tional ways-by court-ordered contempt for non-payment or garnish-
ment of wages40 or by use of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act.41 In addition, the 1974 Amendments established two
new methods. First, if no other state has undertaken enforcement
32. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (26) (A)
tPamphlet No. 1, 1975), set out at note 30 supra. See also id. § 656(a).
33. Id. § 657(a).
34. Id. § 653. The organizational separation is intended to increase the likeli-
hood that this administrative function will be carried out.
35. Id. § 653(b).
36. Id. § 654. Both the state and federal child support units must be organiza-
tionally separate from the other welfare units. Id. §§ 652(a), 654(3). Unlike
the prior provision, 42 U.S.C. § 602(17) (B) (1970), the state unit need not be
within the welfare agency. It could, for example, be placed in the office of the
state attorney general. S. REP. No. 93-1356, supra note 5, at 9213.
37. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 654(4) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
38. Id. § 656(a)(1)(A).
39. Id. § 656(a)(1)(B). See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
40. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §§ 244, 245 (McKinney 1964).
41. UNIFORm RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (1968 version).
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of a support order and no other reasonable enforcement procedures
are available, the state may apply to the child support unit in HEW
foir permission to bring a federal court suit.4 2 Jurisdiction, without
regard to amount in controversy, is provided by the 1974 Amend-
ments. " Secondly, if "diligent and reasonable efforts to collect such
amounts" have failed, the state may request the Secretary of HEW
to certify the arrearages to the Secretary of the Treasury for collec-
tion., The latter will then collect it "as if such amount were a tax
imposed by subtitle C" 4 5-the income tax withholding section of the
Internal Revenue Code.-
Finally, the 1974 Amendments introduced strict requirements for
the auditing of state child support collection programs.47 A state
failing to operate a satisfactory support program will lose five per-
cent of its federal welfare matching funds.48
The new approach has merit, since the family's benefits will neither
be reduced in anticipation of support payments nor fluctuate due
to irregular payments coupled with constant recomputation of benefits.
In addition, the 1974 Amendments are more likely than the old
provisions to lead to enforcement of child support obligations. 49
While this result is subject to the argument that family estrangement
and bitterness will be exacerbated,5° the family will receive 40% of
the first 50 dollars collected without an offsetting reduction in welfare
benefits.5'
42. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(a)(8) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
43. Id. § 660.
44. Id. § 652(b).
45. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954 , 6305(a).
46. Id. §i 3101-3505. Under these provisions, the obligation must be paid
before its existence or amount is litigated. Since the 1974 Amendments remove
federal court jurisdiction "to restrain or review the assessment and collection" of
support payments collected through IRS procedures, id. § 6305(b), the obligated
parent is left to state judicial or administrative remedies.
47. Sceial Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(a) (4) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
48. Id. § 603(h).
49. See note 17 supra.
50. See text at notes 7-10 supra.
51. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 657(a) (1) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975). This financial incentive was included in order to obtain the
mother's cooperation in identifying the recipient-child's father. S. REP. No. 93-
1356, supra note 5, at 9215. Since, however, assignment of support rights and
cooperation in establishing paternity and collecting the support obligation are
requirements for AFDC eligibility, the need for such an incentive is questionable.
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B. Preliminary Problems Presented by the 1974 Statute
This new statutory scheme, however, raises several problems. The
first is the lack of a hearing before the amount of a support obliga-
tion is established. 5 2 Section 656 (a) (1) provides that in the absence
of a court order, the amount is determined under a state formula
approved by the Secretary of HEW,5 3 in effect permitting the assess-
ment and collection of support payments without a hearing at which
an obligated parent can first dispute the existence or amount of his
obligation.54
A strong argument can be made that this scheme violates due
process. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.5 the Supreme Court held
that garnishment procedures freezing wages without a prior hearing
violated due process. There, a schedule of amounts was statutorily
set for withholding wages to be paid to the garnisher; the AFDC
provision is equivalent except that the amounts to be imposed absent
a court order are set by regulation. The taking of wages for a
support obligation imposes the same burdens on the individual that
produced the requirement of a hearing in Sniadach. Support levels
have traditionally been set without resort to fixed formulas. 0 Courts
have considered the important factors to include the financial cir-
cumstances, future expenses, other support responsibilities, age, health
and accustomed style of living of the parties.57 These six factors
cannot be adequately dealt with in a formula, and they are strong
reasons for requiring, in order to satisfy due process, a prior hearing,
whether judicial or administrative, to determine the amount of
support orders under section 656 (a) (1) .1
52. The lack of a statutory provision for a hearing is not filled by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA), which establishes elements of due process
that must be provided in administrative hearings. 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970). The
APA only applies to determinations by agencies of the federal government. Id.
§ 551(1). Thus a constitutional due process problem is presented.
53. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.G.A. § 656(a) (1) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
54. This result would be especially onerous if the IRS collection procedure
were employed, under which the non-supporting parent must pay first and sue
for a refund later. See note 46 supra.
55. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
56. At least one court has held that the use of a formula to determine the
amount of child support payments is clearly erroneous. Barlow v. Barlow, 282
S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
57. Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 324 (1965).
58. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 656(a) (1) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
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An asserted state interest in protecting its welfare funds does not
override the constitutional requirement of a prior hearing. Such an
interest was argued in Shapiro v. Thompson 9 but the Court held
it insufficient to override the constitutional right to travel.10 By
analogy, neither should it be compelling in the face of a constitu-
tional right to a hearing. In addition, protection of the fisc was
rejected in Goldberg v. Kelly0 ' because of the burden that would
attach to an eligible recipient if funds were lost even for a short
time. In the support context, an order imposed under regulations
would create similar burdens for a parent who is "overcharged" on
the amount of his obligation. The new provision prohibiting dis-
charge of the support obligation in bankruptcy increases the burden.62
Such a burden, therefore, would be too great to be overridden by a
state desire to save money.
A similar due process problem is raised by the use of the IRS as
a collection mechanism. Under tax collection procedures, the disputed
taxes must be paid first, before the obligation or its amount is
judicially tested. The 1974 Amendments impose these procedures
in the child support context. This is, in effect, the collection of a
judgment without a chance to appear, which is constitutionally
mandated when other judgments are collected. Thus the IRS pro-
cedures arguably violate due process when applied to the collection
of child support obligations.
A second problem with the 1974 Amendments is the conflict of
interest created by an administrative determination of the level of
the support obligation, even if a hearing is provided.63 Since the new
scheme provides a five percent penalty for failure to operate an effective
59. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
60. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) is not inapposite. The
Court there found asserted state interests, among them the most efficient alloca-
tion of state resources, sufficient to meet the "rational basis" equal protection
test. See note 124 infra. Unlike the instant situation, the state's interests in
Dandridge did not have to meet the higher equal protection test (i.e. compelling
interest), applied when a state seeks to infringe upon a constitutional right.
61. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
62. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 656(b) (Pamphlet No. 1,
1975).
63. The 1974 Amendments require that the states undertake to establish
paternity and secure support from absent parents, id. § 654(4), and that the
federal unit establish standards to make the state programs effective, id. § 652
(a) (1). The 1974 Amendments do not, however, specify whether these determina-
tions are to be made in an administrative or judicial forum.
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program to recover funds from non-supporting parents,"4 and still
permits the child support unit to be a part of the state welfare
department,65 it is in the interest of the agency to obtain as high a
rate of support recovery as possible. 6" This "interest" would render
objectivity impossible. Such a situation, akin to being tried before
a judge interested in the outcome of the case,67 is inherently unfair.
Thus it can be argued that the determination of paternity and
support should be judicial, rather than administrative, functions."8
Additional support for the argument that the setting of support
obligations should be a judicial function, performed in a prior hear-
ing, is found in a careful reading of the 1974 Amendments. Both
of the enforcement procedures-certification of child support obliga-
tions to the Secretary of the Treasury and the bringing of a federal
court suit-speak in terms of a "court order."60 No specific enforce-
ment procedure is provided for administratively determined support
obligations. It would be necessary, therefore, for the agency to seek
64. Id. § 603(h).
65. See note 36 supra.
66. This would be true even if the support unit were a separate organizational
entity. Loss of federal funds could still be attributed to, and blamed on, that
unit. It, therefore, would seek to maximize the support payments collected.
Furthermore, the impetus to achieve higher recoveries is itself increased because
of the previously unavailable partial reduction in federal funding. A serious
problem in welfare administration has been the unavailability of any federal
penalty for state improprieties except total loss of federal matching funds. HEW
has never imposed that penalty because of the severe impact it would have on
recipients in a penalized state. Note, AFDC Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to
Need: The Impact of Dublino, 49 Im. L.. 334, 336 (1973-74) and sources
cited therein. The states, therefore, have been virtually free flagrantly to disre-
gard HEW viewpoints that conflicted with their own. The new provision, how-
ever, changes this situation; the five percent penalty is not so severe that HEW
would avoid imposing it and the stringent auditing requirements increase the
likelihood that HEW will learn of violations.
67. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
68. Prejudice in having the determinations made by an agency, rather than
by a court, may be cured if there is a later de novo judicial review of the agency
decision. Cf. Fung Ho v. White 259 U.S. 276 (1922). The system, however,
should be set up to avoid the creation of prejudice initially.
69. The former states that "[n]o amount may be certified for collection under this
subsection except the amount of the delinquency under a court order for sup-
port . .. ." Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(b) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975) (emphasis added). The latter requires that the federal child
support unit "receive applications from States for permission to utilize the courts
of the United States to enforce court orders for support .... " Id. § 652(a) (8)
(emphasis added).
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a court judgment before the special statutory collection procedures
could be utilized. This would be wastefully duplicative, rendering
the administrative procedure efficient only when support order com-
pliance is readily forthcoming. Previous experience suggests that
such instances are infrequent. 70
A third problem with the new AFDC-NOLEO provisions is the
extent to which they insert the federal government into domestic
relations-an area traditionally left to the states. 71 Such an intrusion
is, most likely, justifiable as a necessary and proper7 2 measure to
protect federal welfare funds. The Parent Locator Service and col-
lection mechanisms are, however, also available to non-welfare fam-
ilies., When so applied, no "necessary and proper" justification exists
for permitting the federal government to intrude into the manner
in which the states deal with their non-welfare-related domestic rela-
tions problems. There is some authority holding that federal intrusion
into domestic relations violates the tenth amendment, which reserves
to the states power not specifically delegated.74 That position would
70. See note 17 supra.
71. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 84-85 (2d ed. 1970).
President Ford, in signing the Social Services Amendments of 1974, expressed
reservations that "certain provisions of this legislation go too far by injecting the
Federal Government into domestic relations. Specifically, provisions for use of the
Federal courts, the tax collection procedures of the Internal Revenue Service and
excessive audit requirements are an undesirable and an unnecessary in-
trusion of the Federal Government into domestic relations." Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 2, Jan. 13, 1975, at 20, quoted in
Lascaris v. Shirley, 43 U.S.L.W. 4422 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975). This interference
will be greatest if paternity and support decisions are made at the administrative
level, thus rendering ineffective state statutes giving to family courts exclusive juris-
diction to make those determinations. See, e.g., 29A N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAw §§
411, 511 (McKinney 1963), as amended, § 511 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
73. The Parent Locator Service can be utilized by any "authorized person,"
which is defined to include courts, parents, guardians, and agents of the child,
as well as child support agencies. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 653(c) (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975). When the Service is used by parents, guardians,
or agents of a child, a fee is charged. Id. § 653(e) (2). In addition, the
paternity determination and collection procedures available under the state plan
may be utilized by non-recipients on application and, if the individual state so
requires, payment of a fee. Id. § 654(6). The fact that the services used by
non-recipients may involve some cost, for which reimbursement may seem proper,
does not affect analysis of the constitutional power under which Congress has
acted, Congress cannot set up a profit-making corporation without foundation in
the enumerated powers.
74. Cleveland v. United States, 146 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1945), aff'd on other
grounds, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); McCarty v. Hollis, 120 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1941).
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be tempered by finding a constitutional basis for the federal inter-
vention, as the necessary and proper clause provides. In its absence,
however, and despite the broad interpretation given the necessary
and proper clause,75 the child support provisions may be unconsti-
tutional, being beyond the power of Congress when applied to non-
welfare parents. 6
A puzzling provision of the 1974 Amendments grants federal court
jurisdiction over actions properly certified through the Secretary of
HEW.77 A finding must be made that a federal court suit "is the
only reasonable method of enforcing" a support order before the suit
can be brought.7s It may be speculated, therefore, that federal suit
is expected to compensate for shortcomings in the state enforcement
procedures. Nevertheless, the advantage to be gained by making the
federal courts available to the states79 for enforcement purposes is
unclear.
When more than one state is involved in issuing and enforcing sup-
port orders, full faith and credit questions are raised.s0 A support order
75. McGulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
76. Those groups who supported passage of the 1974 Amendments, such as the
National Organization of Women, focused on the impact of the legislation on
non-welfare families. See Cowley, Whitman & Bale, Paying Their Dues, Nzws.
WEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 55-56. For such families, the Parent Locator Service
and support collection mechanisms may be most beneficial. The federal mechanism
will not be utilized except on election of the parent having custody and, it may
be hypothesized, only against parents able, but unwilling, to meet their obliga-
tions. When utilized against welfare fathers, on the other hand, the mechanisms
are of a different character. The mother is not permitted to choose, on the
basis of her assessment of what is best for her children and her relationship
with their father, whether or not to pursue him through the child support pro-
visions of the 1974 Amendments. Furthermore, welfare fathers are unlikely to
include men who flaunt obligations they could otherwise afford. Rather, these
men are likely to have marginal incomes themselves, which are perhaps depleted
by later-acquired family obligations.
77. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 660 (Pamphlet No.
1, 1975).
78. Id. § 662(a) (8) (B).
79. The statute as written would permit the state to sue without regard to
amount in controversy, but the obligated parent wishing to contest some question
of the obligation's existence or amount would be subject to, and probably barred
by, the amount in controversy requirement. This result may not be unwelcome,
from the point of view of sparing the federal court docket. If, on the other
hand, federal courts are expected to provide more uniform enforcement, opening
the remedy only to the states may be self-defeating at worst and an unfair tipping
of the scales at best.
80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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must be given full faith and credit only if it is not prospectively
modifiable.8 ' Amounts that have accrued are, ordinarily, not subject
to modification and, thus, entitled to full faith and credit. The forum
has the option to adopt and enforce the support orders as its own,
but no constitutional compulsion exists to do so.82 As to a modifiable
order, the forum "has at least as much leeway to disregard the judg-
ment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State in which
it was rendered."83 Provision for federal court jurisdiction is puzzling
because the federal courts are under the same full faith and credit
requirements as state courts. They are no more obligated to recognize
and enforce a state judgment for future support payments than is a
sister state. Thus it is difficult to conceive of the advantage to be gained
by resort to federal enforcement rather than state enforcement. The
state's desire to mandate an on-going flow of payments, in order to
avoid a continuing return to court as amounts become due, is no
better served by federal than by state jurisdiction. Perhaps the
statute's drafters hypothesized or hoped that federal courts would
be more likely to choose to extend full faith and credit, in the
absence of requirement, than the state courts. Such guesswork, how-
ever, is a sorry basis on which to legislate.
Finally, the 1974 Amendments are problematic with respect to
statutory rights84 to privacy85 The 1974 Amendments make available
81. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1
(1910).
82. For a more complete discussion of full faith and credit requirements as to
support orders see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 552 (rev. ed. 1968);
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 187-88 (1971).
83. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947).
Since full faith and credit complications are raised when judicial enforcement
of modifiable support orders is sought, use of the courts is not a preferred en-
forcement mechanism. An enforcement mechanism not having these problems
is provided in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act § 2, which
requires enforcement of orders sued on outside the issuing state, despite modi-
fiability. The 1974 Amendments require that this avenue be exhausted before
federal courts are involved. The Uniform Act, therefore, may be the first and
better procedure.
84. The constitutional right to privacy has not been extended to provide pro-
tection for "privacy in its 'primary or strong sense'-the ability to keep secret
personal information about oneself." Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection
for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 670, 770 (1973). Thus statutory pro-
tection is needed. For a discussion of the constitutional privacy problems, other
than record-keeping, raised by NOLEO see text at notes 143-54 infra.
85. [F]amilies function better in private than they do if exposed to public
scrutiny. To the extent that the dysfunctional family is a problem in the
197s]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
information concerning "the most recent address and place of employ-
ment of any absent parent" that is contained either in HEW files or
in the records of "any other department, agency, or instrumentality,
or [sic] the United States or of any State."8 6 This provision, as pre-
viously noted, seems to be aimed at tapping the extensive information
available in IRS files.
The issue here involves neither constitutional rights to privacy nor
violations of statutorily-mandated confidentiality. First, the confi-
dentiality provision in the Internal Revenue Code87 confers a statutory
privilege only;88 Congress has the power to permit certain types of
disclosures without infringing on constitutional rights.8 9 Secondly,
the 1974 Amendments specifically provide that address and employ-
ment information can be made available "notwithstanding any other
provision of law." 90 The issue is, therefore, one of policy to be ad-
United States, and to the extent that encouragement is to be given to the
functional family, it might be to the state's advantage to promote privacy.
The economic costs of dysfunction are high, while the costs of privacy are
comparatively low.
Brodie, Privacy: The Family and the State, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 743, 759.
86. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 653(b) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
87. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7213(a)(1), provides that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States to divulge or to make
known in any manner whatever not provided by law to any person the amount
or source of income, profits, losses, expenditures, or any particular thereof, set
forth or disclosed in any income return .... "
88. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 1 F.R.D. 190,
191-92 (D. Conn. 1940).
89. Cf. United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378 (1925).
90. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 653(b) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
This negates othervise-existent conflicts with other statutes requiring con-
fidentiality. Thus disclosure for AFDC purposes would not conflict with the
Internal Revenue Code's confidentiality provision. Cf. United States v. Dickey,
268 U.S. 378 (1925), United States v. Tucker, 316 F. Supp. 822 (D. Conn.
1970). Nor would a conflict be found with the AFDC confidentiality provision,
which was rewritten by the 1974 Amendments. The original provision, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1970), required that the states "provide safeguards which
restrict the use or disclosure of information concerning applicants and recipients
to purposes directly connected with the administration of aid to families with
dependent children. . . ." The new section reads: "provide safeguards which
permit the use or disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients
only to (A) public officials who require such information in connection with
their official duties, or (B) other persons for purposes directly connected with
the administration of aid to families with dependent children." Id., as amended,
42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(9) (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975).
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dressed to Congress.0 ' The question to be answered is whether such
use of tax records, the confidentiality of which has been jealously
guarded, is a desirable policy. In signing into law the 1974 Amend-
ments, President Ford stated that "the establishment of a parent
locator service in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
with access to all Federal records raises serious privacy and administra-
tive issues. I believe that these defects should be corrected in the
next Congress and I will propose legislation to do so."92 Secretary of
HEW Weinberger also expressed reservations about opening IRS
files, noting the potential abuse of automated personal data systems. 93
The use and abuse of IRS files is an issue of increasing concern. In
fact, the Privacy Act of 1974 94 established a Privacy Protection Study
Commission,, 5 which is mandated to investigate "whether the Internal
Revenue Service should be prohibited from transferring individually
identifiable data to other agencies and to agencies of State govern-
nents . . . ...,
An argument can be made that IRS files should not be used in
carrying out the policies of the Social Services Amendments of 1974.
The provision requiring disclosure of information from agency files
states that "[n]o information shall be disclosed to any person if the
disclosure of such information would contravene the national policy
or security interests of the United States or the confidentiality of
census data.""7 The IRS files contain as much or more personal in-
formation as do census files. This, plus the strong policy to protect
IRS information, argues that IRS files should also be held beyond
the reach of support order enforcement authorities as a matter of
.national policy." This interpretation is buttressed by legislative
91. Something is said in the briefs, and was said at the bar, as to the wis-
d m, on the one hand, of secrecy, and, on the other hand, of publicity, in
respect to tax returns. But that is a matter addressed to the discretion of the
laismaking department, with which the courts are not concerned, so long as
no constitutional right or privilege of the taxpayer is invaded ....
United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378, 386 (1925).
92. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, supra note 71.
93. Hearings on S. 1842, supra note 5, at 81-82.
94. Privacy Act of 1974 § 5, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, reproduced
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6881, 6893-97.
95. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975).
96. Privacy Act of 1974 § 5(c) (2) (B) (ii), Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896,
reproduced in 1974 U.S. CODF CONG. & AD. NEws 6881, 6894.
97. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 653(b) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975) (emphasis added).
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history suggesting that any records containing information as sensitive
as census files would be protected by a "national policy" against dis-
closure.9 s
Concern with the privacy of personal records in general, and of
IRS records in particular, coupled with support provisions requiring
the invasion of such records, reflects schizophrenic policies. This can
reasonably be viewed as a repressive attitude toward non-supporting
fathers of, primarily, welfare families. Welfare families are singled
out, since non-welfare families can choose whether or not to pursue
their non-supporting member through IRS sources.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL Issu-s RAISED By NOLEO
The previous section considered administrative and related policy
issues raised by the 1974 Amendments. It is submitted that the
NOLEO provisions suffer from problems much more basic than
these statutory mechanics.
The statute as it now stands reflects the view that federal efforts
to find absent parents and enter support orders against them are
"useless" without the cooperation of recipients and that such co-
operation will not be voluntary.99 While this may be true when the
name of the putative father is not known, in other instances the
welfare department and, hence, the Parent Locator Service, may have
sufficient information to proceed without the recipient's cooperation.
The new Amendments, nevertheless, mandate the recipient's parti-
cipation in locating the absent parent. The constitutional implica.
tions of NOLEO, therefore, become important.
A. Self-Incrimination
A woman who reveals information about a non-marital liaison
may face the possibility of losing her children in a neglect proceed-
ing.1 0 In this respect NOLEO may operate as a "suitable home"
98. "Information of a national security nature or information in such highly
confidential files as those of the Bureau of the Census would not be divulged."
S. RImp. No. 93-1356, supra note 5, at 9212; cf. remarks of President Ford, supra
note 71.
99. This view was suggested in Saiz v. Goodwin, 325 F. Supp. 23, 25 (D.N.M.),
rev'd and remanded, 450 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1971).
100. While neglect proceedings can be either civil or criminal, the fifth amend-
ment by its terms is not applicable to a civil proceeding. U.S. CoNST. amend.
V. It does, however, apply "alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever
the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it."
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
[Vol. 9:203
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/9
RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN AFDC
provision.101 The suitable home provision in AFDG requires that wel-
fare agencies transmit information concerning child abuse and neglect
to law enforcement officials. 10 2 The requirement, however, conflicts with
the AFDC confidentiality provision, which permits disclosure of infor-
mation concerning applicants and recipients "only to (A) public
officials who require such information in connection with their official
duties, or (B) other persons for purposes directly connected with the
administration of aid to families with dependent children ... ."103
Before NOLEO was passed, no information that a client provided
to a welfare agency could be released for any reason. NOLEO
became an express exception to the confidentiality requirement,
permitting information concerning the father's whereabouts to
be communicated to law enforcement officials. If, through the use of
such information, the putative father is located and paternity pro-
ceedings initiated, immunity granted to the mother would protect her
from criminal prosecution for fornication or adultery,104 but the in-
formation could be used in a civil neglect proceeding. "While the
federal confidentiality provision places restrictions on the disclosure
of information, the unsuitable home section demands full disclosure
101. For a discussion of the Louisiana suitable home provision and the Flemming
Ruling, which prohibited using a "suitable home" as an eligibility requirement,
see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 321-27 (1968).
102. Social Security Act § 402(a)(16), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(16) (1970)
provides:
[W]here the State agency has reason to believe that the home in which a
relative and child receiving aid reside is unsuitable for the child because of
the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child it shall bring such condition
to the attention of the appropriate court or law enforcement agencies in the
State, providing such data with respect to the situation it may have ....
103. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (9) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
104. But see State v. Plummer, 5 Conn. Cir. 35, 241 A.2d 198 (1967), in which
a welfare mother was prosecuted for lewd and lascivious carriage on the basis of
information originally given to the police by welfare authorities. The court held
the arrest to be the result of police observation and found no error in the authori-
ties' refusal to permit the recipient to investigate the source of the information. I1d.
at 41, 241 A.2d at 202. In the sole case in which self-incrimination was held a
defense to prosecution for lewd and lascivious cohabitation, the court found that
statements made in connection with NOLEO provisions, then a requirement for
eligibility, were coerced and involuntary. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 1 POVERTY
L. RPTR. § 1310.10 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1967). For more complete discussions see
Comment, AFDC Eligibility and the Mandatory Paternity Suit, supra note 10, at
181; Silver & Efroymson, supra note 9, at 76.
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of the same information. Immunity based on such a contradiction
,provides no protection against self-incrimination at all."
'105
In Doe v. Shapiro,10 6 the plaintiff-mother claimed that state regulations
conditioning her AFDC eligibility upon disclosure of her child's puta-
tive father violated her constitutional right against self-incrimination.
While the majority was skeptical about the state immunity statute's
effectiveness, 07 it did not rule on the constitutional issue. Instead,
the court accepted defendant's argument that the statute must be
interpreted to safeguard individuals in plaintiff's position 0 8 and thus
did not consider the conflict between the state disclosure statute and
the AFDC confidentiality provision.
In re Cager0 9 is frequently cited as proof that self-incrimination
fears are not fanciful:
Perhaps the most notorious incident of the use of information
required by notice provisions occurred recently in Maryland. In
that state, an applicant for AFDC is required to fill out a form
stating certain information about the father (s) of her children
and giving her name. She must, as a condition of eligibility for
AFDC, then take the form, which is a request for action against
the father, to the State's Attorney. Amid great publicity of his
campaign against illegitimacy and welfare abuse, the State's
Attorney arrested several mothers who had applied for AFDC
and had filed the required form in his office. These women were
originally charged with criminal neglect; later the State's At-
torney instituted civil neglect proceedings in the Juvenile Court.
The results of either criminal or civil suits where neglect is found
would be removal of the children from the home, although only
in a criminal action would the mother be fined or imprisoned.110
105. Comment, AFDC Eligibility and the Mandatory Paternity Suit, supra note
10, at 181.
106. 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970).
107. Although CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-435b (1975) gave full immunity for
statements made in the paternity proceeding itself, the court questioned whether
its immunity extended to involuntary statements made out of court prior to the
paternity proceedings. 302 F. Supp. at 763. If the immunity given "in connec-
tion with such proceedings," CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-435b (1975), excluded
involuntary pre-hearing statements, then the mother could be subject to criminal
prosecution for fornication or lascivious carriage. Id. § 53-21 (1975). The
statute would, therefore, violate the rule laid down in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), whereby an individual may not be compelled to
give inculpatory information unless it cannot be used in a criminal prosecution
against him. Id. at 78-79.
108. 302 F. Supp. at 763.
109. 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968).
110. Silver & Efroymson, supra note 9, at 55.
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The Cager trial court's finding of neglect, based solely on the fact that
each mother had had more than one illegitimate child, was reversed
on appeal on the ground of violation of confidentiality."'1 The court
held, however, that illegitimacy should continue to be one factor
considered in a neglect proceeding, although it alone would no longer
be sufficient for a finding of neglect. 1 2 Thus the possibility remains
that, in a child neglect proceeding brought under the suitable home
provision, the use of NOLEO information could be considered a
purpose "directly connected with the administration" 1 3 of AFDC and,
therefore, unprotected by the confidentiality provision. 1 4
Now that cooperation in establishing paternity and obtaining
and enforcing support orders is an express condition of AFDC eligi-
bility,11 the risk is increased that disclosures might be used in child
neglect proceedings under the suitable home provision. Because
suitable home statutes were poorly enforced in the past,118 it was
unlikely that information gained through NOLEO, evidencing ille-
gitimacy or promiscuity, would be used to take children away from
their mothers. A study of the Florida suitable home statute found
that, in spite of diligent efforts to enforce the law, only one percent
of the mothers gave up their children in response to the loss of
assistance, and in only one-half percent of the cases were children
removed from their homes by the court."17 Hopefully the new statu-
tory scheme will not increase the danger of suitable home enforce-
ment, carried out through information required to be disclosed under
the eligibility provisions.
B. Equal Protection
Even after NOLEO eligibility provisions were held invalidils and
before the 1974 Amendments overruled those decisions, efforts by
111. 251 Md. at 481-83, 248 A.2d at 389-90.
112. Id. at 479-80, 248 A.2d at 388.
113. Social Security Act § 402(a)(16), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(16) (1970).
114. Silver & Efroymson, supra note 9, at 56. This interpretation would eliminate
the conflict between §§ 602(a) (9) and (16) of the Act (see text at notes 102-05
supra), but the resolution would hardly favor the recipient.
115. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (26) (Pamphlet
No. 1, 1975).
116. Chilton, Social Control Through Welfare Legislation: The Impact of a
State "Suitable Home Law," 5 LAW & Soc'v REv. 205 (1970).
117. Id. at 221.
118. See cases cited note 27 supra.
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some states to coerce paternity information from welfare recipients
were not abandoned. For example, after Connecticut's regulations
making compliance with NOLEO a condition of eligibility were
invalidated,119 the State passed another statute aimed at securing the
same information."20 While avoiding the statutory conflict that
led to invalidation of the prior regulations,121 the new Connecticut
statute raises serious equal protection problems.
The statute subjects unwed mothers who refuse to name the
putative father to civil contempt, punishable by a fine of 200 dollars,
imprisonment for a year, or both.122 The statute applies to all unwed
mothers, regardless of their welfare status; mothers receiving welfare
are required to make the disclosure to the welfare commissioner while
mothers not on welfare must give this information to the child's
guardian or guardian ad litem. In Doe v. Norton12s plaintiffs argued
that the statute was based on the suspect category of illegitimacy and
should, therefore, be subject to strict scrutiny equal protection stand.
ards. 24 The court rejected this argument, concluding that the statute
119. Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S.
902 (1970); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dis-
missed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970).
120 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-440b (1971).
121. Connecticut's first regulation designed to obtain paternity information pro-
vided for the termination of welfare benefits to illegitimate children when the
mother refused to disclose the father's name. Application of this regulation was
enjoined in Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dis.
missed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970), on the ground that it conflicted with the federal
statute by imposing an additional eligibility requirement. Connecticut then
amended its regulation to terminate welfare payments only to the non-cooperating
mother, leaving the children on the rolls. The per curiam opinion in Doe v.
Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 (1970),
found the amended regulation subject to "the same vice as the original" and in
violation of the Shapiro injunction.
122. The unwed mother who names the putative father is immune from prose-
cution for crimes, such as fornication or adultery, that her testimony reveals.
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 52-435b, c (1975).
123. 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Roe v.
Norton, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974). Oral argument was recently
heard and is reported at 43 U.S.L.W. 3469-71 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1975).
124. 365 F. Supp. at 78-79. "Strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" are the two
equal protection standards. The former is applicable whenever a statutory classifica-
tion is based upon suspect categories such as race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), and illegitimacy, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), or when the clas-
sification impinges on fundamental interests such as the nght to travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Under strict scrutiny "any classification which
serves to penalize the exercise of that [constitutional] right, unless shown to be
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was beneficial, not burdensome, to illegitimate children. 25 In so doing,
the court ignored the emotional and psychological stresses inherent in
support proceedings that may further alienate the father.126
Having determined that the less stringent rational basis equal pro-
tection test was applicable, the Norton court identified the govern-
mental interest as the enforcement of the parental duty to support
one's children. The court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the statute
impermissibly discriminates between unwed mothers receiving wel-
fare benefits and unwed mothers not on welfare, reasoning that un-
wed mothers not on welfare were similarly treated, since they were
obligated to disclose the father's name to the child's guardian or
guardian ad litem. 12 7 The court further held that the statute is rea-
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). The rational basis test,
applicable in all other instances, requires that "the classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
The equal protection test applied is crucial to the outcome of the case. "Some
situations evoked the aggressive 'new' equal protection, with scrutiny that was
'strict' in theory and fatal [to the challenged legislation] in fact; in other contexts,
the deferential 'old' equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and
virtually none in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term- Forward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 8 (1972). For a definitive discussion of equal
protection doctrine see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAIv.
L. REv. 1065 (1969).
125. 365 F. Supp. at 79. The court quoted from Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309, 318 (1971): "The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who
is dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public's concern. The de-
pendent child's needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate
those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what
the mother claims as her rights." 365 F. Supp. at 79 n.24.
126. See text at notes 5-10 supra.
127. 365 F. Supp. at 81.
It is submitted that the statutory requirement that the non-recipient mothers
disclose the father's identity was included to avoid equal protection problems,
since children not on welfare are unlikely to have guardians or guardians ad litem
to whom the mothers are accountable. Connecticut law does not contemplate
that all illegitimate children are likely to have guardians. The state statute gov-
erning guardianship provides in the pertinent part: "The mother of each illegitimate
child under eighteen years of age shall be the sole guardian of the person of such
child.... If [the probate] court finds.., that either or both [parents] are unfit
persons to have charge of such child or have abandoned or neglected to make
suitable provision for the support or education of such child . . . , it may remove
as guardian such parent or parents . . . and appoint a, guardian . . . ." CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-43 (1975) (emphasis added). Thus no guardian exists to
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sonably related to the public's interest in preserving welfare funds
even if it applied only to unwed mothers receiving welfare assistance. 128
Yet such a classification, while reasonably related to saving money,
does not assure parental support for all illegitimate children, regard-
less of their welfare status-the interest the court had earlier identi-
fied. Additionally, the desire to protect state funds as the justification
for the statute might render it unconstitutionally overinclusive,129 since
it requires that non-recipient mothers also report the name of the
child's father.
The 1974 Amendments, however, do not evoke the same equal
protection problems embodied in the Connecticut statute. Both
statutes purport to apply to non-recipients as well as recipients.
Unlike the Connecticut statute, however, the penalty provided by
the federal statute-loss of welfare benefits-is applicable only to
AFDC recipients. In addition, only welfare recipients are forced to
cooperate with the Parent Locator Service; non-recipients can do so
if they choose. Since Congressional action in social and economic
matters may be incremental without denying equal protection,5 0 and
since the differential impact of the federal statute is rationally related
to a state desire to save welfare funds,1'3 this special impact on the
welfare population may not constitute an equal protection violation.
It does, however, suggest that the child support efforts will not fulfill
their intended purpose to provide parental support for all children.132
whom the mother can report the name of the putative father unless the mother
has been found unfit and a guardian appointed by the probate court. This rarely
occurs. See generally Chilton, supra note 116. Similarly, Connecticut law does not
contemplate the existence of a guardian ad litem unless a suit has arisen in which
the child has an interest. CONN. GEN. STAT. RaV. § 45-54 (1975). Undoubtedly
the statute was not drafted with any serious thought to the possibility of suit by a
guardian or guardian ad litem.
128. "In the case of these plaintiffs, it is the state, not a private party, which
furnishes to the plaintiffs and their children welfare assistance in accordance with
their needs. Because the state provides those benefits, it is rational that it should
take steps to enforce the prior obligation of their fathers to provide that support."
365 F. Supp. at 82.
129. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rv.
341, 351-52 (1949).
130. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
131. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
132. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (Pamphlet No. 1,
1975). It may be credibly argued, however, that Congress never had a serious
intention to "benefit" any children other than AFDC recipients. The legislative
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It also suggests that Congress was not really concerned with child
support in general but only with controlling the rising cost of
AFDC.'-
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner5 4 represents a different
approach to the equal protection problem. Kirchner held that treat-
ment of persons in state mental institutions is a proper state function,
benefiting society as a whole. Therefore, burdening the relatives of
institutionalized persons with the costs of that treatment constituted
an arbitrary charge on one class of society in violation of equal pro-
tection. One authority explains Kirchner as an expansion of the
parens patriae concept.'- The state's obligation to provide for needy
citizens has gradually developed into a relationship so direct that,
when support is concerned, the citizen's relationship to his family is
secondary.,- The legislature is precluded from imposing the financial
burden on the recipient's relatives because those relatives do not ex-
perience any special benefit."' Rather, society as a whole benefits from
alleviation of the poverty and dependence produced by the complex
intermeshing of economic, social and psychological causes.135
history, while asserting an interest in all children, identifies the benefits of the
statute only in terms of its effect on AFDC:
The Committee believes that all children have the right to receive support
from their fathers. The Committee bill ... is designed to help children
attain this right including the right to have their fathers identified so that
support can be obtained. The immediate result will be a lower welfare cost
to the taxpayer but, more importantly, as an effective support collection
system is established fathers ,%ill be deterred from deserting their families
to welfare and children will be spared the effects of family breakup.
S REP. No. 93-1356, supra note 5, at 9206.
133. The legislative history explicitly states that the primary purpose of the
bill is to obtain parental support for AFDC recipients, S. REP. No. 93-1356,
supra note 5, at 9218, although non-welfare families can use the Parent Locator
Service upon payment of a fee. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §
654(6)(B) (Pamphlet No. 1, 1975).
134. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964).
135. tenBroek, supra note 3, pt. 3, 614, at 640 (1965).
136. Tully, supra note 8, at 44.
137. tenBroek, supra note 3, pt. 3, 614, at 641. Professor tenBroek notes that
justifying relative responsibility provisions as attempts to save welfare dollars does
not avoid the Kirchner reasoning, That justification "can accurately be understood
S.. only as a qualification upon a larger and more affirmative purpose of which it is
a part, the purpose of maintaining the poor and caring for them in their poverty.
* . . Responsibility of relatives provisions are, therefore, a publicly created and
enforced method of raising money to achieve a public purpose -caring for the
poor." Id.
138. Id. at 641-42.
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Since the purpose of the Social Security Act is "to promote the
general welfare,"' 39 and since Kirchner could apply equally to public
aid other than the institutional treatment of the mentally ill,140 it
can be argued that NOLEO provisions constitute an attempt to
charge a specific class with the costs of public programs when the
members of the class do not receive a special benefit. Kirchner, how-
ever, has not been so broadly construed. Subsequent California cases
have held Kirchner applicable only when persons from whom support
is sought are not liable for that support under any statute other than
the welfare statute.141 Since fathers are liable for support both under
NOLEO provisions and under domestic relations statutes, 42 they
would retain their support responsibilities despite Kirchner and its
progeny.
C. Privacy
1. General Principles and Precedents
The privacy argument, applied to NOLEO, is that compelled dis-
closure of a putative father's name invades the mother's right to
maintain intimate relationships without state intrusion.' s4 The
scope of the right to privacy is uncertain, 44 however, and decisions
of the Supreme Court do not provide clear constitutional precedent
for the recipient mother's argument. 45 Nevertheless, two categories of
privacy cases are relevant to NOLEO-those dealing with raising
children and those dealing with contraception and abortion.
139. Social Security Act of 1935, Preamble, 49 Stat. 620.
140. tenBroek, supra note 3, pt. 3, 614, at 639.
141. E.g., County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal. App. 2d 534, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); County of Alameda v. Kaiser, 238 Cal. App.
2d 815, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Dist. Ct. App. 1065).
142. E.g., 29A N.Y. FAMLY COURT ACT § 413 (McKinney 1963).
143. NOI.EO challenges, prior to the 1974 Amendments, were decided on
statutory grounds, leaving the constitutional privacy issues unresolved, E.g., Doe
v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488
(1970).
144. Discussions of privacy often deal with tort concepts rather than purely
constitutional questions. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 802-18 (4th ed. 1971);
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rv. 193 (1890).
145. Privacy cases often involve other constitutional elements, such as search and
seizure, obscenity, and freedom of association. Because of the presence of these
other elements, the cases are only nominally "privacy" cases and therefore do not
support a privacy argument against NOLEO.
A right to privacy defense, both in obscenity, United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels
of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
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Supreme Court decisions have recognized the right of parents to
direct their children's upbringing."11 Based upon these decisions the
argument might be made that a mother has the right to direct the
upbringing of her children, including the right to decide whether
their support will come from their father or from the state. Such de-
cisions, however, dealt with situations in which the state's proper con-
cern was being met by independent parental action.147 NOLEO is
(1973), and search and seizure cases, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), acknowledges the sanctity of the home as the substantive right protected.
".. . Stanley depended, not on any First Amendment right to purchase or possess
obscene materials, but on the right to privacy in the home. Three concurring
Justices indicated that the case could have been disposed of on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds without reference to the nature of the materials. Stanley v. Georgia,
supra, at 569 (STEWART, J., joined by BRENNAN and WHITE, J.J., concurring)."
United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126 (1973). Since
NOLEO does not involve a physical invasion of the home, such cases are of no
precedential value in a right to privacy argument against NOLEO requirements.
The right to freedom of association has been recognized and was protected in
two major cases involving the NAACP, a factor rendering the applicability of
those cases to NOLEO dubious. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Both cases recognized and protected forms
of association that "pertain to the social, legal and economic benefit of the
members." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), citing NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963). It is evident that personal relationships
were not the kind of association contemplated by the NAACP cases. Having its
basis in the first amendment, the right of association is closely related to explicitly
protected rights of speech and assembly, and contemplates a group. NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U,S. 1 (1974), undercuts application of right of association-privacy arguments
to NOLEO. Boraas upheld a zoning ordinance that limited occupancy of single-
family residences to no more than two unrelated persons. The Court rejected
association and privacy arguments because a "family" could "entertain whomever
it likes," 416 U.S. at 9, and held it within the police power to "lay out zones
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean
air make the area a sanctuary for people." 416 U.S. at 9. NOLEO provisions
inhibit freedom of association even less than the zoning provision in Boraas.
Welfare mothers can live with "whomever they like," but the state's interest in
promoting "family values" will justify intrusion into that life-style to the extent
necessary for securing paternity information.
146. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (statute requiring
children of certain ages to attend only public schools "unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923)
(statute prohibiting the teaching of languages other than English interfered with
"the power of parents to control the education of their own").
147. In Pierce the children were receiving a comparable education in private
schools. In Meyer school children were taught English in addition to German, so
the state's interest in a literate electorate was served.
1975]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
easily distinguished. A mother's reliance on welfare drains the state's
fiscal resources. In addition, permitting a mother to choose welfare
frustrates the state's interest in enforcing parental support duties.
Since the Supreme Court does not recognize unlimited parental au-
thority, parents' childrearing preferences, and hence their privacy,
must yield to a sufficiently strong state interest.14' It appears unlikely
that courts will thwart legislative attempts to enforce the parental
duty to support one's children, as reflected in NOLEO, merely to pro-
tect a mother from the embarrassment of revealing the name of her
children's father.
The second category of constitutional privacy cases includes the
contraception14D and abortion5 0 decisions. The contraception cases
protect the privacy of the intimate relationship between a man and a
woman, regardless of marital status.' 5' In NOLEO an intimate rela-
tionship is not involved since the situation arises only when the rela-
tionship has been broken. It can be argued, however, that NOLEO
hampers or destroys opportunities to re-establish the relationship be-
tween parents of the child.152 Yet this argument overlooks a legitimate
state interest in securing parental support, which the courts would
likely view as outweighing speculative chances for reconciliation .1"
148. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), involved a guardian who
permitted her ward to sell religious literature on the streets based upon a bona
fide belief that such activity was a prerequisite to spiritual salvation. Despite the
fundamental nature of the free exercise of religion, the Court held that the state
could prohibit the child's employment.
149. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
150. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
151. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
152. See text at notes 7-10 supra.
153. While recognizing that the right of privacy has "some extension" into the
areas of marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child
rearing, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), balanced the burdens
faced by a woman to whom abortion is unavailable against asserted state interests
in regulating access to abortion. The holding, requiring unfettered access to
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The application of established privacy analysis would thus be of no
avail to a welfare recipient challenging NOLEO.54
2. Judicial Treatment of Privacy Arguments
Courts have not generally been required to decide constitutional pri-
vacy arguments because attacks on state NOLEO-type provisions have
been decided on statutory grounds.15- A privacy challenge presented
in Doe v. Norton,'3 however, was analyzed in terms of power to com-
pel testimony.':, That power is limited only by the protection against
self-incrimination, and since both the mother and putative father are
abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy, turned less on the woman's
interests than on a lack of compelling state interests during those first months:
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an
embryo and, later, a fetus .... The situation therefore is inherently different
fro-,m marital intimacy, or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which
Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner and Pierce and Meyer
i ere respectively concerned .... It is reasonable and appropriate for a State
to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of the health of
the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved.
The woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses
must be measured accordingly.
Id. at 159.
154. One writer has argued that application of existing contraception-abortion
principles to NOLEO-type situations is improper:
[U]se of the constitutional right of privacy to protect the individual when the
question is secrecy and control over information rather than a right of
autonomous decision serves only to confuse the issue and to make the "right
of privacy" more amorphous than it already is. Whatever the merits of using
the term "privacy" to denominate what is essentially a limited right of
autonomy, the courts would be N% ell ad% ised to treat various kinds of "private"
interests differently and to use Griswold and Roe only when autonomy is
involved. Until and unless the Supreme Court demonstrates an inclination
to extend constitutional protection to the qualitatively different forms of
"privacy" involved in disclosure cases, the two issues should be kept clearly
separated by lower courts.
Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, supra note 84,
at 771-72. The writer advocates a limited return to substantive due process
concepts, to the extent of requiring "that disclosures must in fact serve a valid
governmental purpose and that all of the information requested must be relevant
to the accomplishment of that purpose." Id. at 772 n.660. For a case of the
type to which the writer refers see Shulman v. New York City Health & Hosps.
Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 1093, 335 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1972), vacated &
remanded, 41 App. Div. 2d 714, 341 N.Y.S.2d 242, judgment reinstated, 75
Misc. 2d 150, 346 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
155. See cases cited note 27 supra. But see Saiz v. Goodwin, 450 F.2d 788 (10th
Cir. 1971); Doe v. Schmidt, 330 F. Supp. 159, 163 (E.D. Wis. 1971), in which
constitutional privacy arguments were viewed as meritorious.
156. 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Roe v.
Norton, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974). See text at notes 118-29 supra.
157. 365 F. Supp. at 75-78.
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granted immunity from prosecution based upon their disclosures,18
the court found that the statute did not unduly invade the privacy
of the individuals involved. The court sanctioned disclosure despite
the possibility of "those situations in which the testimony sought to
be elicited may prove embarrassing, or otherwise impinges upon the
sensitivities of the witness whose testimony is sought."'1 9 It is apparent
however, that a legitimate judicial treatment of the right to privacy
cannot be framed in self-incrimination terms; the former does in fact
deal with embarrassments and sensitivities, while the latter does not.
Although the courts will be the ultimate balancers of the personal
and state interests, it is submitted that NOLEO provisions will prevail
in the absence of a substantive examination of the state's alleged in-
terests. If, however, courts question the reasonableness of the state's
arguments, they will likely discover that disclosure provisions do not
make fathers more responsible, benefit deserted children, or save state
welfare money.1 60 Substantive examinations of asserted state interests
are occurring in equal protection cases. 1 1 It should be essential in
all cases that governments be required to assert legitimate, provable
interests before constitutional guarantees of any nature are subordi-
nated.
CONCLUSION
NOLEO is a manifestation of the general dissatisfaction with the
welfare system-its increasing rolls and increasing costs. As disenchant-
ment grows, attempts to reverse or slow the trend proliferate. As
each step in turn proves unsuccessful, the legislatures vainly seek to
dose the gaps in welfare abuse and make their theories work. But
NOLEO has been part of federal law for a quarter of a century and
fathers are still abandoning their children. That is a great tragedy
in itself. Equally tragic is our inability or unwillingness to examine
the theories underlying our laws. Instead we blindly pursue a course
already begun in the vain belief that it is the details that foil us
rather than our basic premises.
158. Id. at 76 nn.15-16.
159. Id. at 75.
160. See text at notes 5-19 supra.
161. Gunther, supra note 124, at 17-24.
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